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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
IDAHO POWER CO. v. COMMISSIONER: DEPRECIATION
DEDUCTION ALLOWED ON EQUIPMENT USED
TO CONSTRUCT CAPITAL FACILITIES
In Idaho Power Co. v. Commissioner,1 the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit allowed a current deduction for depreciation of equip-
ment used in the construction of capital improvements, reversing a de-
cision of the Tax Court which held that depreciation of such equip-
ment is a cost of construction which must be capitalized and depreciated
over the useful life of the property constructed.2 Idaho Power Com-
pany is a public utility in the business of providing electricity to its cus-
tomers. It regularly makes capital improvements and builds new facil-
ities using its own employees and equipment3 In its books of ac-
count, the company had capitalized the depreciation of equipment at-
tributable to these construction projects as required by the Federal
Power Commission4 and the Idaho Public Utilities Commission. 5 How-
ever, on its tax returns the company deducted the depreciation on its
equipment, including depreciation allocable to capital construction,6
based upon a composite useful life of ten years for the equipment so
depreciated.1 The Commissioner of Internal Revenue disallowed this
deduction and capitalized the equipment depreciation attributable to
construction of the capital assets, allowing instead a depreciation de-
duction for the amounts so capitalized spread over the thirty-year life
of the property constructed.8 The Commissioner's action was upheld
1. 477 F.2d 688 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3261 (U.S. Nov. 5, 1973)
(No. 263).
2. Id. at 689.
3. In 1962, Idaho Power constructed $7,139,940 worth of facilities and in 1963
$5,642,342 worth. The amount of the disallowed deductions for equipment deprecia-
tion was $140,430 in 1962 and $96,812 in 1963. Id. at 690.
4. 18 C.F.R. pt. 101, at 220-21 (1973).
5. 477 F.2d at 690.
6. Tax accounting does not have to follow accounting for reporting purposes,
particularly where the tax treatment is clearly provided by law. See 477 F.2d at 690
n.3. However, depreciation for income tax purposes has generally followed the ac-
counting concept of depreciation. See A. MURRAY, DEPRECIATION 5 (1971); Egger,
Depreciation Updated, 12 Tur. TAx INST. 207, 208 (1963).
7. 477 F.2d at 690.
8. Id.
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by the Tax Court9 on the grounds that depreciation of construction
equipment is a cost of construction of new facilities which must be
capitalized under section 2631" of the Internal Revenue Code as part
of the basis of the property constructed. The Ninth Circuit reversed,
holding that section 16711 of the Code allowed the deduction of de-
preciation on the equipment.12
Since the imposition of the first modem income tax in 1913,18 the
federal policy in income taxation has been to tax net income, i.e., gross
income minus the costs of earning that income.14 This is accomplished
by allowing the deduction of substantially all expenses incurred in con-
ducting the taxpayer's trade or business or his profit-seeking transac-
tions. 15 For example, section 162 of the 1954 Code continues the
practice of allowing a deduction for all ordinary and necessary business
expenses incurred during the taxable year.' Part VI of the Code also
allows for the deduction of interest,' 7 taxes,' losses,'" bad debts, 20
and other items,21 as well as providing in section 167 for the current
deduction of a reasonable allowance for the exhaustion, wear and tear,
and obsolescence of property used in the taxpayer's trade or business
or of property held for the production of income.22 The rationale for
9. Idaho Power Co., 39 P-H Tax Ct Mem. 70,083 (1970), rev'd, 477 F.2d 688
(9th Cir.), cert. granted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3261 (U.S. Nov. 5, 1973) (No. 263).
. 10. Section 263 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides in relevant part:
"No deductions shall be allowed for . . . [a]ny amount paid out for new buildings
or for permanent improvements or betterments made to increase the value of any
property or estate."
11. Section 167 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides: "There shall be
allowed as a depreciation deduction a reasonable allowance for the exhaustion, wear and
tear (including a reasonable allowance for obsolescence)-(1) of property used in the
trade or business, or (2) of property held for the production of income."
12. 477 F.2d at 689.
13. Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, § II, 38 Stat. 167.
14. See B. BrrTKER & L. STONE, FEDERAL INCOME, ESTATE, AND GIFT TAXATION 231
(4th ed. 1972); C. KAmN, PERSONAL DEDUcTIONs IN Tim FEDERAL INCOME TAX 1 (1960);
A. MURRAY, DEPRECIATION 13 (1971); TAX FOUNDATION, INC., DEPRECTION ALLOW-
ANCEs: FEDERAL TAX POLICY AND SolmE ECONOMC AsPEcTs 8 (1970).
15. See B. BrrrKER & L. STONE, supra note 14, at 231; Pechman, Erosion o1 the
Individual Income Tax, 10 NAT'L TAX I. 1, 8 (1957).
16. INT. Rav. CODE OF 1954, § 162.
17. Id. § 163.
18. Id. § 164.
19. Id. § 165.
20. Id. § 166.
21. See id. §§ 161-88.
22. See note 11 supra. See also Cedarburg Fox Farms, Inc. v. United States,
283 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1960). The computation of the depreciation allowance is based
upon the cost, salvage value, and useful life of the property being depreciated. INT.
REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 167(d), (f), (g). See also Tanforan Co. v. United States,
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the depreciation deduction is to permit the "tax free recovery" of the
total cost of the asset by allowing the ratable deduction of the cost of
the asset over the years in which it is productive.23
All of the deductions under Part VI of the Code are subject to the
exceptions provided in Part IX.24  These exceptions include section
263 which forbids current deductions for capital expenditures,2 5 re-
quiring instead that expenses incurred in the creation or acquisition of
a capital asset be capitalized and amortized over the useful life of the
equipment.
Thus, sections 263 and 167 are like two sides of the same coin.
The first forbids current deductions of the costs of acquiring or con-
structing capital assets, while the second allows deductions for the de-
preciation in value of the asset once acquired. A problem arises, how-
ever, as to the proper tax treatment of the depreciation of construction
equipment owned by the taxpayer for whom a capital asset is being con-
structed. This is because the depreciation of the construction equip-
ment can be viewed either as a current business expense attributable
313 F. Supp. 796 (N.D. Cal. 1970), affd, 462 F.2d 605 (9th Cir. 1972).
The courts have sometimes spoken of the depreciation deduction as having the
purpose of providing a tax-free fund to replace the asset. See, e.g., Detroit Edison Co.
v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 98, 101 (1943); City of Knoxville v. Knoxville Water Co.,
212 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1909). The initial cost and not the replacement cost has always been
used to compute the allowance, however. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 167(g);
Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, § II, 38 Stat. 167.
23. See Massey Motors, Inc. v. United States, 364 U.S. 92, 96 (1960); Reisinger v.
Commissioner, 144 F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1944); H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.
22-25 (1954); 4 J. MERTENs, LAw Op FEDERAL INcomE TAX&TION § 23.04 (1973 rev.).
This rationale for the depreciation deduction roughly corresponds to the rationale for de-
preciation in accounting, which is to allocate the expense of an asset to the accounting
periods which are benefited by the asset. See Hertz Corp. v. United States, 364
U.S. 122, 126 (1960); accord, H.R. REP,. No. 1337, supra at 22-25; TAX FOUNDATON,
INC., DEPRECIATION ALLOWANCES: FmERAL TAX PoLiCY AND SOMB ECONOMIC As-
PEc'rs 9 (1970).
The Code of 1954 seems to have departed from this traditional accounting theory
somewhat, and has introduced measures "liberalizing" depreciation allowances to en-
courage investment, industrial expansion, and full employment. See INT. Rnv. CODE OF
1954, § 167(b); H.R. REP. No. 1337, supra at 22-25. However, the "liberalized" esti-
mates of useful life and methods of allocating the cost over the years of service allowed
by the 1954 Code were also justified as being more in accord with the actual pattern
of loss of economic usefulness. Id.
24. INT. REv. CODE, OF 1954, section 161 provides: "In computing taxable income
under section 63(a), there shall be allowed as deductions the items specified in this part
[VI], subject to the exceptions provided in part IX (see. 261 and following, relating to
items not deductible)." (Emphasis added.)
25. See note 10 supra. Capital expenditures are expenditures that will contribute
to income-producing activities for periods longer than the current taxable year. B.
BrrrxLR & L. STONE, supra note 14, at 315.
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to the consumption of one asset-the construction equipment-or as
part of the cost of constructing another capital asset-the power plant.
This problem can be broken up into three questions of statutory in-
terpretation. First, is the construction equipment "property used in the
trade or business" under section 167? Second, is the depreciation of
equipment used in the construction of a capital asset a capital expendi-
ture within the meaning of section 263? Third, if the requirements of
both sections 167 and 263 are complied with, how are the two sections
to be reconciled?
Prior to the instant case, it was generally, although not universally,
held that the depreciation of construction equipment which is owned by
a taxpayer and used in the construction of capital assets for the tax-
payer's own use had to be capitalized and depreciated over the life
of the asset constructed.20 However, there were few cases on point
and even fewer which gave the question more than cursory treatment. -
In Great Northern Railway Co.,28 the first case to treat the issue, the
Board of Tax Appeals held that where a railroad transported men and
equipment to a construction site on its regularly scheduled commercial
trains, the depreciation of the train equipment attributable to the con-
struction work was to be capitalized. The Board adopted the straight-
forward approach that if the depreciation was attributable to the con-
struction of capital facilities, it would be a cost of the capital asset and
should therefore be capitalized. 29 The Board did not discuss, as did later
cases, whether the train equipment, to the extent that it was involved
in transporting men and materials to the job site, was also property
used in the trade or business, and whether such a finding would further
entail the conclusion that, even though the property was concurrently
being used in the construction of a capital asset, the depreciation should
26. E.g., Southern Natural Gas Co. v. United States, 412 F.2d 1222, 1264-69 (Ct.
Cl. 1969); Churchill Farms, Inc., 38 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. I 69,192 (1969), a! 'd sub
nom. Bayou Verret Land Co. v. Commissioner, 450 F.2d 850 (5th Cir. 1971); Produc-
ers Chem. Co., 50 T.C. 940 (1968); Great N. Ry., 8 B.T.A. 225, 260-63 (1927),
a'ffd, 40 F.2d 372 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 855 (1930); Rev. Rul. 380, 1959-2
CuM. BurLL. 87; Treas. Reg. §§ 1.46-3(c)(1), 1.48-1(b)(4) (1964); 4 J. MERTENs, LAw
oF FEDERAL INcomE TAxATiON § 23.11a (1973 rev.). But see Great N. Ry., 30
B.T.A. 691 (1934).
27. But see Southern Natural Gas Co. v. United States, 412 F.2d 1222 (Ct. Cl.
1969).
28. 8 B.T.A. 225, 260-63 (1927), a/I'd, 40 F.2d 372 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
282 U.S. 855 (1930).
29. The Board stated: "In our opinion, a part of the wear and tear of the train
equipment of the rails, ties, etc., may be properly capitalized when men and materials
for construction work are transported in transportation service trains." Id. at 263.
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be currently deductible.30 These considerations, however, constituted
the basis for a change in the Board's position several years later in the
second Great Northern Railway Co. 31 case. Great Northern II was
factually indistinguishable from Great Northern I. In Great Northern II,
however, the Board held that the train equipment, even though used in
part for construction purposes, was property used in the railroad's trade
or business.22 Therefore, depreciation on this equipment was held to be
currently deductible. 3   While the Board failed to provide any guide-
lines for determining when equipment used in construction could also
be considered to be used in the taxpayer's trade or business, under
Great Northern II, if equipment is used in the taxpayer's trade or busi-
ness, the depreciation of it is currently deductible regardless whether
it can be attributed to capital account.
The Board's position in the Great Northern II was subsequently
challenged by the Internal Revenue Service in Revenue Ruling 59-380.",
In this ruling, the Service held that "depreciation sustained on construc-
tion equipment owned by a taxpayer and used in the erection of capi-
tal improvements for its own use is not an allowable deduction, but
shall be added to and made a part of the cost of the capital improve-
ments. '35 Further, it stated categorically that such construction
30. Plainly, it would not have been difficult for the Board to find that the de-
preciation of the train equipment attributable to the transportation of men and ma-
terials to the job site was incurred in the railroad's trade or business. The trains in-
volved were regularly scheduled commercial service trains on which the men and ma-
terials for the construction activities were but a minor portion of the total passengers
and freight transported. The workmen transported constituted only .48% of the total
passengers carried by the trains, and the construction materials constituted only .67%
of the freight tonnage. The additional expense incurred in carrying the men and
materials were negligible. 8 B.T.A. at 233. The Board's failure to discuss the question
of whether the depreciation was incurred in the railroad's trade or business is susceptible
to at least two interpretations. First, the Board may have thought that, to the extent
the train equipment was used for construction purposes, it was not used in the railroad's
trade or business. Second, it may have thought that, even if the equipment was used
in the taxpayer's trade or business, since at the same time it was being used for con-
struction activities, the depreciation was still allocable pro tanto to the capital
account and therefore not currently deductible. Indeed, the revenue laws have forbidden
current deductions for capital expenditures since 1913. Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16,
§ II, 38 Stat. 167.
31. Great N. Ry., 30 B.T.A. 691 (1934).
32. Id. at 708. Perhaps one reason for the Board's reversal of its previous position
was the Commissioner's failure either to cite or to rely on Great Northern I in its
brief. Id. It has subsequently been suggested that "the Board was influenced by what it
construed to be a reversal of the Commissioner's position." Southern Natural Gas
Co. v. United States, 412 F.2d 1222, 1267 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
33. 30 B.T.A. at 708.
34. 1959-2 Cum. BULL. 87.
35. Id. at 88. See also Rev. Rul. 252, 1955-1 Cum. BULL. 319, which held that
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equipment cannot be treated as property used in the regular trade or
business of the taxpayer. 6 Under this approach, there is no conflict
between sections 167 and 263 of the Code, because, if the equipment
is used in construction activity, ipso facto, it cannot be property used
in the trade or business and subject to the current deduction for deprecia-
tion provided for in section 167.11
Revenue Ruling 59-380 was the basis for the holding by the Court
of Claims in Southern Natural Gas Co. v. United States18 that equip-
ment depreciation which is incurred in the creation of capital assets for
the use of the owner of the equipment must be capitalized. 3 In South-
ern Natural Gas, the taxpayer only engaged in construction activities
"from time to time," and the equipment in question was used largely
for non-construction activities.40 The court, in finding that these con-
struction activities were not part of the trade or business of the tax-
payer,41 stated: "[E]quipment used in constructing additional facilities of
the permanent improvement type is used in "a" trade or business ....
However, it is not used in "the" trade or business of the taxpayer
.... ,42 Since the equipment was held not to be used in Southern's
trade or business insofar as it was being used for construction purposes,
no current deduction for depreciation attributable to the construction
activities was allowed.4 3
timber -planting costs, including depreciation of equipment, such as trucks used in plant-
ing, should be capitalized and recovered through depletion when the timber is sold.
36. Rev. Rul. 380, 1959-2 CuM. BuLL. 87, 88.
37. The Service relied upon New Quincy Mining Co., 36 B.T.A. 376 (1937), in
arriving at its holding in Revenue Ruling 59-380. In New Quincy, the taxpayer wanted
to deduct currently the depreciation of construction equipment owned by it and used in
the excavation of a mine. The Board held, however, that this depreciation must be
capitalized and recovered through the depletion allowance. The Board found that the
equipment was not used in the taxpayer's trade or business because, inter alia, such
excavation was not a regular activity of the taxpayer, but was engaged in only once.
36 B.T.A. at 383. The Service's reliance on New Quincy might therefore indicate that
it would take a contrary position where the construction activity was regularly engaged
in by the taxpayer, finding that, in such a circumstance the construction equipment
could be considered to be used in a taxpayer's trade or business. Such an inference
cannot be drawn from the face of Revenue Ruling 59-380, however. Nevertheless, it
is questionable whether the Service would concede that the depreciation of the construc-
tion equipment would be currently deductible even if the equipment could be considered
to be used in the trade or business of the taxpayer.
38. 412 F.2d 1222 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
39. Id. at 1265-68.
40. Id. at 1264.
41. Plaintiff's business was the operation of a natural gas pipeline system, and not
the construction of capital assets. Id.
42. Id. at 1267.
43. A possible inference from Southern Natural Gas is that if one could consider
equipment owned by a taxpayer and used by him to create a capital asset for his own
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In light of these prior decisions, when the Idaho Power case was
presented to the Tax Court,44 it was to be anticipated that the court
would base its decision on whether the construction equipment was
used in the taxpayer's trade or business. The Tax Court, however,
adopted a different approach and stated that regardless whether the
construction equipment, when used to create capital assets, is property
used in the taxpayer's trade or business, the depreciation of that equip-
ment is not currently deductible in either case, but must be capitalized
under section 263.4r Therefore, the Tax Court held that if the de-
preciation could be viewed as a cost of the construction of a capital
asset, it must be capitalized.
In reversing the Tax Court, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
in Idaho Power Co. v. Commissioner,4" adopted the more traditional
"trade or business" approach of the cases prior to the Tax Court's
decision. The Ninth Circuit found that the construction equipment was
property used in Idaho Power's trade or business within the meaning
of section 167. The court said that the frequency and regularity with
which Idaho Power constructs new capital facilities "point[s] to the
conclusion that construction of facilities is a major aspect of the tax-
payer's trade or business. 4 7  It held, therefore, that the depreciation
use as property used in his trade or business, then the depreciation of that equipment
would be currently deductible under section 167, regardless whether it is allocable
to the capital account. It is doubtful, however, that the Southern Natural Gas court
would take this step. Instead, it has adopted a narrower interpretation of "property
used in the trade or business" which excludes such construction equipment altogether.
Although the court recognized that, broadly speaking, the expansion of a commercial
enterprise through the acquisition or construction of capital assets may be considered to
be within the scope of that enterprise's "business," it found that this interpretation of
"business" is too broad for the purposes of section 167. The court instead interpreted
"business" to include only the operation and use of capital assets, and not their con-
struction. Accordingly, such construction equipment cannot be considered to be used
in the trade or business under section 167. 412 F.2d at 1266.
44. 39 P-H Tax CL Mem. % 70,083 (1970), rev'd, 477 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1973).
45. Id. at 429-30.
46. 477 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1973).
47. Id. at 696. The conclusion that the frequency and regularity with which
Idaho Power Company constructs new facilities indicates that construction projects are
an integral part of its trade or business collides directly with Southern Natural Gas Co.
v. United States, 412 F.2d 1222 (Ct. Cl. 1969). Although it might be argued that the
negative implication of the Court of Claims' holding in Southern Natural Gas that con-
struction activities conducted on a sporadic basis are not part of the taxpayer's trade
or business might be that activities engaged in regularly are a part of his trade or
business, it is unlikely that the Court of Claims would subscribe to this view. See
note 43 supra.
Nevertheless, the Idaho Power court's conclusion is not unreasonable; and it may
plausibly be argued that the construction activity of Idaho Power is so integrally re-
lated to its power generating operations, and done on such a regular basis, as to consti-
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of the equipment allocable to construction was to be deducted currently
rather than capitalized. Nevertheless, in light of the Tax Court's posi-
tion, this argument was not sufficient, in itself, to justify the Ninth Cir-
cuit's holding. Accordingly, the court propounded three further argu-
ments to support its position.
First, the court said that since the depreciation of construction
equipment represents a "decrease in value," and not an "amount paid
out" for the construction of a capital asset as required by the language
of section 263, the depreciation cannot be treated as a capital expendi-
ture.4 8 Although the court's interpretation of "paid out" as being
equivalent to cash expenditures is perhaps in accord with common usage,
this is a narrower construction of the term than that propounded in
the income tax regulations.4 9 The regulations provide that capital
expenditures include the cost of acquiring or constructing capital as-
sets.50 Traditional accounting practice considers equipment deprecia-
tion as well as cash expenditures to be includable in the cost of acquir-
ing a capital asset.51 In the absence of any legislative provisions to
the contrary, it would seem best to follow the long-standing regulation
supported by traditional accounting practice and treat equipment de-
preciation incurred in creating a capital asset as a cost of that asset.
Indeed, when a taxpayer hires a contractor to construct capital facili-
ties for him, the wear and tear on that contractor's equipment, when
charged to the taxpayer by the contractor, is a part of the cost of the
capital asset. This cost becomes a part of that asset's basis in the hands
of the taxpayer to be depreciated over the useful life of the asset. By
tute part of its trade or business. See text accompanying note 58 infra. However,
even if the court in Idaho Power is correct that, under the circumstances of the case,
the construction equipment is used in the taxpayer's trade or business, this does not
necessarily entail the further conclusion that the depreciation of such equipment should
be currently deducted and should not be capitalized. See notes 45 supra and 56-58
infra and accompanying text.
48. 477 F.2d at 694-95. The "paid out" language was a part of the 1913 in-
come tax. Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, § II, 38 Stat. 167. It has persisted until the
present. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 263.
49. There is no explanation of the capital expenditure or depreciation provisions in
the committee reports. See H.R. REP. No. 5, 63d Cong., 1st Sess. (1913); S. REP.
No. 80, 63d Cong., 1st Sess. (1913).
50. Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-2(a) (1958) provides that capital expenditures include:
'The cost of acquisition, construction, or erection of buildings, machinery and equip-
ment, furniture and fixtures, and similar property having a useful life substantially
beyond the taxable year." (Emphasis added.)
51. Where an asset is constructed by the taxpayer, the cost basis includes applicable
overhead. A. MuRAuy, DEPRECrATION 20 (1971). Depreciation is a part of overhead.
See M. GORDON & G. SHILLINGLAW, AccOUNTINa: A MANAGEMENT APPROACH 568
(4th ed. 1969).
52. See W. PATrON, AccouNrANrs' HANDBOOK 652 (3d ed. 1952).
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parity of reasoning, equipment depreciation should be considered a
cost of the capital asset when the equipment is owned by the taxpayer
for whom the asset is being constructed. The Ninth Circuit's holding
to the contrary leads to disparate treatment among taxpayers, since
large firms with the resources to construct their own capital facilities
will benefit from more rapid tax write-offs, while firms that must "pay
out" for new capital assets will be required to capitalize the entire cost
of the asset, including wear and tear on the construction machinery.
A second but perhaps more significant argument by the court
states, in effect, that where sections 167 and 263 conflict so that de-
preciation of property used in the taxpayer's trade or business can be
conceptualized as a cost of a capital asset, the depreciation provision
should be preferred to the capitalization provision. The court contended
that deductions "specifically allowed" by the Code, such as for the de-
preciation of property used in the trade or business, should not be
capitalized even though incurred in the construction of a capital as-
set.5 3  These "specifically allowed" deductions, according to the court,
differ from the general deduction for business expenses under sec-
tion 162, which, the court agreed, is not available when the expense is
incurred in acquiring a capital asset.5 4  The court concluded by saying
that, since the construction equipment is used in the taxpayer's trade
or business, the depreciation of that property is deductible under sec-
tion 167 regardless of whether it might be allocable to the capital ac-
count. 65
The conclusion that expenses whose deductibility is specifically
allowed by the Code should not be capitalized, even when incurred
by the taxpayer in the construction of capital facilities, but that ex-
penses whose deductibility is generally provided for in section 162 should
be so capitalized, is supported neither by the organization nor by the
language of the Code. Section 161,56 -by its language, provides that all
deductions specified by Part VI, which includes section 167, as well as
53. 477 F.2d at 693. The court relied on All-Steel Equipment, Inc., 54 T.C. 1749
(1970), rev'd on other grounds, 467 F.2d 1184 (7th Cir. 1972). While All-Steel
involved the cost of inventory and expenditures for taxes, losses, and research and ex-
periment rather than capital expenditures and depreciation, it purported to explain the
Code's overall scheme. The Ninth Circuit in Idaho Power also is supported by Pacific
Coast Redwood Co., 5 B.T.A. 423 (1926); Spring Valley Water Co., 5 B.T.A. 660
(1920). But see Herbert Shainberg, 33 T.C. 241 (1959).
54. 477 F.2d at 693. See also General Baneshares Corp. v. Commissioner, 326
F.2d 712 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 832 (1964); Spangler v. Commissioner,
323 F.2d 913 (9th Cir. 1963); Midland Empire Packing Co., 14 T.C. 635 (1950).
55. 477 F.2d at 696.
56. INT. RaV. CoDE oF 1954, § 161. See note 24 supra.
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section 162, shall be subject to the exceptions provided in Part IX, which
includes section 263. Thus, according to the plain language of the
Code, the fact that equipment used to create a capital asset might be
considered to be property used in the taxpayer's trade or business does
not necessitate the conclusion that the depreciation of that equipment
is currently deductible under section 167.17 The Tax Court was there-
fore correct when it stated:
Obviously, the acquiring of capital improvements . . . is appropriate
if not vital to [Idaho Power's] continued operation of its business of
producing and selling electric energy but this fact does not cause the
cost of these capital improvements to be deductible in the year acquired.
The real issue here is whether the portion of the depreciation deduc-
tion for transportation equipment allocable to the construction of capital
improvements should be viewed as a part of the "cost" of such capital
improvements. s
Accordingly, if the depreciation of the equipment is allocable to the
creation of a capital asset, even though the equipment is used in the
taxpayer's trade or business, that depreciation must be capitalized due
to the conjunctive operation of sections 161 and 263.
The third basis for the court's position is the legislative history
of the Code. In its opinion, the Ninth Circuit said that the congres-
sional desire to allow faster tax write-offs through the use of various
new depreciation methods, such as the declining balance method and
the sum-of-the-years-digits method, supports the conclusion that the
depreciation of the construction equipment should not be capitalized,
but should be currently deductible under section 167.1' The court
contended that such treatment of equipment depreciation would result
in a more rapid recovery of the cost of the equipment in conformity
with congressional policy.60  Nevertheless, it is evident that provisions
in the Code providing for the accelerated deduction of depreciation
are irrelevant in answering the threshold question of whether, in the
first instance, such depreciation can properly be deducted. Congress
certainly could not have intended that the provisions for accelerated
depreciation should be interpreted to broaden the class of depreciable
57. The conclusion that there is no magic in the language "used in the trade or
business" which makes the expense currently deductible is supported by the fact that the
court agreed that costs of operating and maintaining the construction equipment, clearly
"ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred . .. in carrying on [a] trade or
business" under section 162, were to be capitalized. 477 F.2d at 690, 695.
58. Idaho Power Co., 39 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. f 70,083, 430 (1970), rev'd, 477
F.2d 688 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3261 (U.S. Nov. 5, 1973) (No. 263).
59. 477 F.2d at 692-93.
60. Id. at 692.
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assets covered by section 167.61 Indeed, the questions whether the
depreciation of property is deductible, and what method should be
used to take the deduction are logically unrelated. If the depreciation
of the construction equipment is not otherwise properly deductible un-
der section 167, congressional policy to encourage the accelerated de-
preciation of property used in the taxpayer's trade or business cannot
make it so.
The Ninth Circuit's holding in Idaho Power is based on the erro-
neous notion, which has received support in prior cases,6" that Code
sections 167 and 263 are mutually exclusive in their coverage. This
conclusion has been shown to be contrary to both the language and the
structure of the Code. It is entirely proper, based upon the Code, the
regulations, and traditional accounting theory, to consider the depre-
ciation of equipment used in the construction of a capital asset as a
part of the cost of that asset. Moreover, section 161 of the Code pro-
vides the basis for reconciliation of sections 167 and 263. Through
the operation of section 161, such equipment depreciation may be cap-
italized under section 263, even if it is incurred in the taxpayer's trade
or business. Failure to recognize the harmonizing influence of section
161 will result in the unequal treatment of taxpayers who own their
own construction equipment and who build their own capital facilities
vis-a-vis taxpayers who must hire outside contractors to perform this
work. Only through a recognition of the proper role of section 161
can the courts properly treat the question of how to resolve the conflict
between sections 167 and 263.
61. Congressional concern over revenue losses resulting from the use of accelerated
methods of depreciation by public utilities led, in 1969, to the enactment of section
167(2) of the Code which freezes the current situation regarding methods of depre-
ciation for many utilities. See S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 171-76 (1969).
62. See notes 37 & 43 supra and accompanying text.
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